Labor Law: Application of a State Remedy by a State Court in an Action Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act by Bendixsen, Glen M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 8
1-1958
Labor Law: Application of a State Remedy by a
State Court in an Action Under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act
Glen M. Bendixsen
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Glen M. Bendixsen, Labor Law: Application of a State Remedy by a State Court in an Action Under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 9 Hastings L.J. 203 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol9/iss2/8
will demand everything in writing before they undertake liability, and the benefit
of immediate accessibility of automobile casualty coverage will be lost.
It is respectfully submitted that National Indemnity Co. v. Smith-Gandy, Inc.
represents an anomaly in the law, and, in view of the strong public policy in favor
of the aspect of automobile insurance it affects, it ought not to be followed.
Raymond L. Mushrush
LABOR LAW: APPLICATION OF A STATE REMEDY BY A STATE COURT IN AN
ACTION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
A court is free to use its own procedural rules in an action brought under the
substantive law of another jurisdiction. The form of remedy, or remedial rights,
are generally thought of as procedural and governed therefore by the law of the
forum. However, often the form of remedy is so intertwined with the substantive
rights that the court treats it as part of the substantive law of the foreign juris-
diction.' This treatment of "procedure" as "substance" involves the problem of
making a determination not amenable to any definite test.2
An examination of the line of cases leading to and following Erie v. Tompkins3
amply illustrates the problem the federal courts have had in distinguishing be-
tween substance and procedure when enforcing state law in diversity of citizen-
ship cases.4 That state courts in actions based on federal law have similarly strug-
gled has recently been demonstrated in the California Supreme Court.
A carpenters union in California, in an industry affecting interstate commerce,
violated the arbitration and no strike clauses in the collective bargaining contract
with the employer. The employer brought suit in the state court, and a preliminary
injunction was granted against the union. In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
District Council of Carpenters,5 the California Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the lower court. The court conceded that as a result of a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills," the con-
trolling law of collective bargaining agreements made in interstate commerce is
now federal law. The Lincoln Mills case dealt with section 301 (a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Law) which gives federal district courts
jurisdiction to entertain suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting interstate
commerce.7 Subsequent to the passage of this act, the state and federal courts have
had concurrent jurisdiction of actions based on such collective bargaining con-
tracts. A state court retains jurisdiction to enforce federal rights unless it is ex-
pressly excluded by the Constitution or an act of Congress. 8 Therefore the em-
ployer in the McCarroll case could have entered a federal court. Had he done so,
1 Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YA r L.J. 333 (1933).
2 ld. at 349-51.
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Tunk, Categorization and Federalism: Substance and Procedure
after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939).
462 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
5 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
6 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See The Su-
preme Court, 1957 Term, 71 HARv. L. Rv. 94, 173-79 (1957) ; Bickel and Wellington, Legis-
lative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1957).
7 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
8 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) ; California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
NOTESFeb, 19581
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
however, an injunction could not have been granted. The provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act9 are applicable to suits brought in federal courts under section
301.10 This act precludes injunctive relief by a court of the United States in labor
management disputes except in specified instances. (Re the jurisdictional issue in
McCarroll, the defendant union contended that its alleged conduct was an unfair
labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act," vesting jurisdiction in the National
Labor Relations Board. Such jurisdiction is exclusive. 2 However, the court held
that the union's conduct was not such an unfair labor practice. Nor is breach of a
collective bargaining agreement alone an unfair labor practice so as to give the
NLRB exclusive jurisdiction.13 ) However, the California court in the McCarroll
case, while recognizing that had the action been brought in a federal court injunc-
tive relief would have been denied,14 reasoned that, as the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is a jurisdictional statute applicable only to federal courts, the remedial powers of
state courts were not affected by it.' 5 Consequently a state court in exercise of its
own procedural rules had power, when enforcing a federal right under section 301,
to grant a specific remedy which would not have been available in a federal court.'0
The dissenting opinion maintained that, as the rights under collective bargain-
ing agreements made in interstate commerce are controlled by federal law,' 7 "that
law must also measure the remedies available for otherwise the federal law is not
being applied."' s The dissent also pointed out that when a remedy "goes to the
very essence" of the right itself, it is more than "mere procedure."' 19
Were the harshness of the remedy the sole criterion for determining whether
or not the form of remedy is part of the substantive law, as contrasted with the
enforcing court's procedural rules-the view of the dissent in McCarroll would
appear the correct view in that case. Certainly, injunctive relief is a harsh form
of relief in the field of labor-management disputes. However, classification of
remedy or other forms of procedure as substantive law in any particular case re-
quires consideration of other equally cogent criteria.20
The narrow issue submitted for examination here is whether or not the Cali-
fornia court in the McCarroll case was correct in holding that in view of the
Lincoln Mills case, a state court enforcing the collective bargaining agreement
was free to use a remedy unavailable in a federal court.2 ' The Lincoln Mills de-
cision included the Norris-LaGuardia Act as one of the federal labor laws which
947 STAT. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
10W. L. Mead v. Teamsters Union AFL, 217 F.2d 6 (1954).
1161 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (1952).
12Lloyd Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); United Packinghouse
Workers v. Wilson Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (1948); Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S.
485 (1953) ; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 355 U.S. 1 (1957). For exceptions to this doc-
trine see United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245 (1949); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
Is Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 443-44 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14 49 Cal. 2d at .... , 315 P.2d at 329.
15Id. at ...., 315 P.2d at 332.
16 Ibid.
17 See note 6 supra.
18 49 Cal. 2d at ...., 315 P.2d at 336.
19Id. at .... , 315 P.2d at 337.
20 See notes 1 and 2 supra. See Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1942).
21 See note 10 supra.
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the federal courts are to refer to in fashioning a body of federal decisional law
to be controlling in actions brought under section 301.P The question before the
court in the McCarroll case was this: can a state court when enforcing a federal
right in a collective. bargaining contract treat the remedy to be given as "proce-
dural?" Whether or not injunctive remedy "goes to the essence" of the substantive
right cannot be definitely answered. The best that can be done is to examine a
few significant cases in which the United States Supreme Court has limited state
courts in the use of their own procedure when enforcing federal law.
First, however, an examination of the instances in which the federal courts
now adhere to state procedure when enforcing state rights discloses that the law
of the state in which the federal court sits must be followed in such "procedural"
matters as statutes of limitations,2 conflict of law rules, 4 statutes requiring secur-
ity for costs in stockholder litigation,25 statutes of frauds, 26 res ipsa loquitur,27
presumptions, burden of proof rules2 9 and local procedural rules which effec-
tively bar enforcement of the claim in the courts of the forum state.30 The test
which the federal courts now use in distinguishing between "substantive" and
"procedural" law is that clearly articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty
Trust v. York. Referred to as the "significant-outcome" or "outcome-determina-
tive" criterion, it is: A state rule is treated as substantive if "it significantly affects
the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of the state that
would be controlling in an action on the same claim by the parties in a state
court."1
3 1
Returning to the enforcement by the state court of federally created rights,
while the outcome-determinative test has never been as clearly laid out, the United
States Supreme Court decisions indicate that in actions to enforce federal law,
federal procedural rules which are outcome-determinative in character are bind-
ing on the state courts to the exclusion of their own procedural rules. In 1915,
in Vermont v. White, an action brought in a state court to enforce a federal right
under the Federal Employee's Liability Act, the Supreme Court held that the
state court was bound by the federal rule on the question of burden of proof.
The Court indicated that while as a general rule the federal and state courts were
mutually free to prevail in matters respecting remedy, matters of substance and
procedure should "not be confounded." Only as long as the question of remedy
involves a mere matter of procedure, and is not one substantially affecting the sub-
stantive rights, is a state court free to use its own practice in enforcing federal
law. 32 Subsequent holdings have amplified rather than limited this doctrine33
Recently the United States Supreme Court held that a state court had erred
in requiring excessive particularity in a complaint alleging negligence under the
2 353 U.S. at 456.
23 Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1942).24 Kaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
25Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
2 6 Macias v. Klein, 203 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
2 Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945
(1952).
2 8Mark v. City of Ormond Beach, 113 F. Supp. 504 (1953).
9Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
30 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
31326 U.S. at 105-06.
82 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
33Hines v. Lowery, 304 U.S. 555 (1938); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944).
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FELA, although the circumstances were apparently such that the state would not
have been condemned for applying the same standards of pleading in an action
upon a substantive right created by another state.3 4 Even more recently, a state
court was held to have erred in denying a jury trial on an issue of fraud in an
action under FELA where a federal court would have granted one.35
It is true that in the majority of the cases indicated here the federal law which
the United States Supreme Court has held binding on the state courts could be
expressly found in an act of Congress. However, the federal courts have the power
to work out a federal decisional law in cases brought under the "arising under"
clause of Article 111.3 6 The Lincoln Mills case was a mandate to the lower federal
courts to work out a federal decisional law for labor contracts in interstate com-
merce. Why should such law be less binding on the state courts than specific stat-
utory law provided by Congress? In Vermont v. White, mentioned earlier, the
federal "procedural" rule of burden of proof was at that time derived not from a
federal statute, but from common law sources by the federal courts. It was held
a substantive aspect of the federally created right under FELA and binding on the
state court. Indeed, it should be remembered that in the converse situation,37 the
specific holding in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins was that in diversity of citizenship cases
in federal courts state decisional law as well as state statutory law was to be fol-
lowed. One of the practical results of this decision is that a federal court must
follow the state court's interpretation of its own statutes. Analogously, the federal
courts having included the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a source of
rights and liabilities of parties in collective bargaining contracts in interstate com-
merce,38 it would appear that a state court, exercising concurrent jurisdiction over
an action that could have been brought in a federal court under section 301, must
honor those rights. The holding in the McCarroll case refused to recognize that
such rights existed on the tenuous grounds that they were procedural.
The hesitancy of the United States Supreme Court to establish a precise rule
to distinguish "substance" from "procedure" when a state is enforcing a federal
right is evidently a result of the palpable impossibility of doing so. Congressional
intent is not always clear as to the form of the applicable remedy. Section 301
points this out. In contrast, the formulation of a rule binding on the federal courts
enforcing state law is more easily accomplished due to the ability of the Supreme
Court to establish incidents of judicial administration and procedural rules bind-
ing on the lower federal courts; thus we have the test formulated in Guaranty
Trust v. York. The doctrine of this case now prevails in the federal courts and has
clearly been extended to the ambit of cases involving labor disputes.39 The perti,
nence of the policy followed by federal courts in enforcing state rights to ques-
tions of policy when a state court enforces federal rights was recognized in the
McCarroll case. Failure to be influenced by the outcome-determinative test was
explained by the court on what appears to be the inaccurate conclusion that a
"mere doubt" has been cast on earlier cases. The court cited two cases as authority
that a federal court is free to use its own procedure, and therefore remedy, when
34 Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
35 Dice v. Akron, Canton, and Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1953).
36 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942).
37 See notes 23-30 supra.
38 See note 22 supra.
39 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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